DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 235 097 SO 015 027

TITLE	The United Nations Peace and Security. Conference on the United Nations of the Next Decade (18th, Burgenstock, Switzerland, June 25-30, 1983).
INSTITUTION	Stanley Foundation, Muscatine, Iowa.
PUB DATE	Jun 83
NOTE	51p.; Photographs may not reproduce clearly.
AVAILABLE FROM	Stanley Foundation, 420 East Third Street, Muscatine, IA 52761 (free).
PUB TYPE	Collected Works - Conference Proceedings (021)
EDRS PRICE	MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS	*Conflict Resolution; Developing Nations; *Disarmament; Foreign Countries; Foreign Policy; *Futures (of Society); Global Approach; International Law; International Organizations; International Relations; Nuclear Warfare; *Peace; *World Problems
IDENTIFIERS	*United Nations

ABSTRACT

Twenty-eight conference participants, consisting of diplomats, government officials, and scholars, strongly urged the General Assembly to begin preparations for a 1985 meeting of the heads of state of the United Nation's 157 member nations. The purpose of the summit would be to provide an opportunity for the members to reaffirm their support of the world organization and to examine how the United Nations might be made to function more effectively in matters of peace and security. The conference participants also called for a strengthening of the role of the Secretary-General in conflict intervention, encouraging him to be more assertive in bringing threats to peace to the attention of the Security Council. Conference attendees recommended that many of the less important duties of the Secretary-General be delegated to others to free him to focus on international conflicts and pacific settlements. Since many nations are circumventing or ignoring the Security Council altogether, thereby weakening its power to intercede in disputes and conflicts, participants suggested that members of the UN should use the Council more frequently. The consensus of the participants was that the greater good is served when member nations bring their disputes before the Security Council for assistance in peaceful resolution, instead of seeking solutions through the use of armed forces. (LH)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

ED235097

The United Nations Peace and Security

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

☐ This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.
☑ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official NIE position or policy.

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE ONLY HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

Georgia Quirk

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

SP 015 027

Eighteenth Conference on the United Nations of the Next Decade

Burgenstock, Switzerland June 25-30, 1983

Sponsored by
The Stanley Foundation
Muscatine, Iowa USA

ISSN 0069-8733

The United Nations Peace and Security

The Stanley Foundation
Report of the Eighteenth
United Nations of the Next Decade Conference
Convened June 25-30, 1983
in Burgenstock, Switzerland

Summary of Recommendations

Rocked by nearly four decades of unprecedented global change, hampered by the confrontational politics of the United States and the Soviet Union, the United Nations is experiencing a crisis of credibility. While its record on economic and social matters has been quite impressive, the United Nations' performance in the maintenance of international peace and security is deficient.

At the Stanley Foundation's most ambitious conference undertaking to date, 28 participants, including former Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, with decades of combined UN experience, met at Burgenstock, Switzerland, to consider ways to strengthen UN efforts in peace and security matters. The conference responded to Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar's call for a

reappraisal of UN performance in his report to the 37th General Assembly.

Conference participants recognized that the potential capabilities of neither the Security Council, the Secretary-General, nor the General Assembly related to the maintenance of international peace and security are fully utilized. In addition, nations all too frequently bypass the United Nations or give inadequate support to UN efforts to maintain international peace and security. UN activities are also hampered by the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union; no organization can be fully effective without the cooperation of its two most powerful members.

The following conclusions drew broad but not always unanimous support from the participants (see also the Rapporteur's Report, the Chairman's Statement, and the Chairman's Observations).

Pacific Settlement

1. The Security Council should more fully utilize its authorities under Chapter VI of the Charter to prevent international disputes likely to endanger international peace and security from escalating into armed conflict.
2. The Security Council should become involved earlier, before disputes reach an explosive stage, in order to exercise preventive diplomacy.
3. The Secretary-General should be more forceful in calling peace threatening situations to the attention of the Security Council; Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar has indicated he will bring more issues to the Security Council.
4. Greater use should be made of the "good offices" of the Secretary-General to mediate disputes; greater availability of skilled negotiators and diplomats would enhance the Secretary-General's capability.
5. The Security Council and the Secretary-General would both benefit from more and better information regarding sensitive situations likely to threaten international peace and security.
6. Communications between the Secretary-General and the Security Council should be improved.
7. The Security Council might use independent committees of economists, lawyers, and other specialists to keep abreast of sensitive situations.
8. *Ad hoc* committees of Security Council members—

perhaps excluding permanent members—might monitor given situations and facilitate diplomatic solutions to disputes.

9. The Security Council should encourage and support efforts of regional organizations to resolve disputes.

Halting Aggression

1. The General Assembly's Committee of 33 should expedite its protracted deliberations on guidelines for peacekeeping operations.
2. Specific mandates are essential when deploying peacekeeping forces.
3. Peacekeeping forces should be closely supervised by the Secretary-General and the governments providing forces and should be monitored by the Security Council.
4. The International Court of Justice should be used more frequently to render advisory opinions regarding application of sanctions.
5. When efforts to halt armed conflict between parties are successful, the Security Council and the Secretary-General should proceed with efforts to resolve the underlying dispute.
6. Consideration should be given to UN financial support of regional peacekeeping operations such as the Organization of African Unity's effort in Chad.
7. Consideration should be given to conditions under which peacekeeping forces or observers might be deployed upon the request of but one of the parties to an international dispute.
8. Consideration should be given to developing Security Council procedures aimed at ending foreign assistance to combatants involved in conflicts within national borders.

Member Nation Commitment

1. A meeting of heads of states should be held to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the United Nations in 1985; this would permit high-level discussions of UN problems and recommitment to the principles of the Charter. The General Assembly should promptly establish a preparatory committee to plan the commemoration.
2. Nonaligned nations should implement their recently announced resolve to improve discipline within their ranks thereby improving the internal UN climate and inhibiting conflicts.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

3. The major powers should give greater support to UN efforts to maintain international peace and security and thus lessen the opportunities for further confrontation.
4. The public—especially the youth—should be better informed on the work of the United Nations through professionally produced long-term public information programs.

Other Practices

1. The Secretary-General must be free from time-consuming ceremonial functions and should delegate more responsibilities and activities to undersecretaries.
2. The General Assembly should improve its procedures in order to foster a climate more conducive to harmonizing the actions of member states and strengthening the peace and security activities of the United Nations.

The Stanley Foundation
420 East Third Street
Muscatine, Iowa 52761 USA
Telephone 319-264-1500

Sohn Arbatov

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Contents

The United Nations: Peace and Security

Summary of Recommendations	**1**
Participants	**6**
Chairman's Statement	**9**
Rapporteur's Report	**20**
Chairman's Observations	**42**
Special Message from the UN Secretary-General	**44**
Stanley Foundation Information	**46**

Permission is granted to duplicate or quote this material so long as proper acknowledgement is made. Additional copies are available free from the Stanley Foundation.

C.M. Stanley

Otunnu



Participants

Affiliations are listed for identification purposes only. Participants attended as individuals rather than as representatives of their government or organization.

Conference Chairman

C. Maxwell Stanley, President, The Stanley Foundation

Participants

Ahmed Esmat Abdel Meguid, Attorney at Law; former Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations

Olu Adeniji, Director, European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nigeria

Georgiy A. Arbatov, Director, Institute of USA and Canada Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences

William B. Buffum, Under-Secretary-General for Political and General Assembly Affairs, United Nations; former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, United States

Sergio Corrêa da Costa, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations

Stephane Hessel, Member, Haute Autorite de l'Audiovisuel; former Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations in Geneva

Imre Hollai, Deputy Foreign Minister, Hungary; President of the 37th UN General Assembly

Rikhi Jaipal, Assistant Secretary-General for Disarmament, United Nations in Geneva; former Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations

Ismat Kittani, Under Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Iraq; President of the 36th UN General Assembly

Jacques Leprette, Permanent Representative of France to the European Community; former Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations

Liang Yufan, Deputy Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations

James Malone, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, United States; Special Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea

Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, Senior Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Argentina; former Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations

Olara A. Otunnu, Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations

Anthony Parsons, Foreign Affairs Adviser to the Prime Minister, United Kingdom; former Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations

Gérard Pelletier, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations

Shizuo Saito, President, Foreign Press Center, Japan; former Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations

Salim Ahmed Salim, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tanzania; President of the 34th UN General Assembly

Louis Sohn, Woodruff Professor of International Law, University of Georgia

Richard Stanley, President, Stanley Consultants, Inc.; Vice President, The Stanley Foundation

Erik Suy, Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva; former Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, United Nations

Anders Thunborg, Minister of Defense, Sweden; former Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations

Stanislaw Trepczynski, Ambassador; former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Poland; President of the 27th UN General Assembly

Brian E. Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, United Nations

Christoph A. van der Klaauw, Ambassador of the Netherlands to Belgium; former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Netherlands

Guenther van Well, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations

Kurt Waldheim, Distinguished Research Professor for Diplomacy, Georgetown University; former Secretary-General of the United Nations

Rapporteur

Alfred Balk, Editor and Publisher, *World Press Review*

Stanley Foundation Staff

Jack Smith, Senior Associate Director/External Relations

Susan Koehrsen, Associate Director/Project Management

Jeff Martin, Associate Director/Policy and Issues

Carol Matthews, Project Assistant

Koehrsen

Chairman's Statement

C.M. Stanley
President, The Stanley Foundation

The following statement was delivered at the opening conference session. C. Maxwell Stanley, drawing on 40 years of study and experience in international relations, served not only as chairman but also as an insightful conference participant.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

The United Nations: Peace and Security

Thirty-eight years ago as guns cooled in Europe, delegates from 50 nations gathered in San Francisco to draft the Charter of the United Nations. Weary of war and appalled by the death and destruction wrought by the conventional weapons of World War II, they were determined to "save future generations from the scourge of war." The delegates sensed the utter necessity of an international organization and sought to avoid the weaknesses that had doomed the League of Nations. Their negotiations were based on the prior Dumbarton Oaks discussions; the Charter they drafted was suitable for the then-known world. Although intent upon improving the League's Covenant, the major nations carefully guarded their national sovereignty. The United Nations they fashioned has no supranational powers; it is an international organization of sovereign nations, not a world government. The well-intentioned delegates at San Francisco did not, and indeed could not, foresee the world in which the United Nations would function. They did not fully anticipate the impact of the proliferation of nations resulting from the imminent collapse of Western colonialism or the dangerous ramifications of the nuclear age. Neither did they perceive the fragile nature of the bonds then uniting the United States, the Soviet Union, China, France, and the United Kingdom.

Explosion

The events following the signing of the UN Charter in 1945 were more revolutionary than evolutionary; the pace of change was explosive. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki soon ended World War II and initiated the turbulent nuclear age. The Soviet Union rejected the US Baruch proposal to internationalize atomic energy and the United States turned a cold shoulder to alternative Soviet proposals to ban the bomb.

Western colonialism disintegrated rapidly. The United States was among the leaders, granting independence to the Philippines in 1946; India soon became an independent member of the British Commonwealth. By 1960, UN membership had risen to 100, double the number of Charter members. The fledgling, newly-

created nations varied greatly in size, resources, development, culture, education, experience, and diplomatic capability.

By 1960, major shifts in the world power structure were underway. US influence was near an all-time high and the United States held a virtual monopoly on nuclear weapons. However, the Soviet Union's rapid recovery from the ravages of World War II, its maintenance of huge military forces, and its commitment to nuclear equality was setting the stage for the bipolarity and the East-West confrontation of the decades to follow. Western Europe, aided by the US Marshall Plan, was becoming an economic power and, through NATO, a military power confronting the Warsaw Pact of Eastern Europe. Mao's China, having driven Chiang Kai-shek from the mainland, was a sleeping giant. Japan, unburdened by the costs of military forces, was staging a dramatic recovery and was becoming an economic power. The many new nations, joined by some older ones, could when working together wield important influence.

1960-1983

The years since 1960 have been marked by significant changes in the credibility and effectiveness on UN efforts to maintain international peace. Despite occasional UN peacekeeping operations, numerous General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, and frequent uses of the good offices of the Secretary-General, there has been a substantial rise in nationalism and an increasing tendency of member states to bypass the United Nations or disregard its efforts to maintain peace, witness Vietnam, Ethiopia-Somalia, Iraq-Iran, the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, or Afghanistan.

Skyrocketing membership has radically changed the United Nations' political complexion. Western domination has vanished, the nonaligned group has organized formally, the North-South confrontation has sharpened, and issues have become increasingly politicized.

Meanwhile, the arms race continues unabated. Soviet-US bilateral negotiations to limit or reduce nuclear weapons are now at a stalemate. The spirit of détente has given way to increasing tensions and harsh rhetoric. Two UN Special Sessions on Disarmament have produced fine words, but no actual reduction of armies, navies, or air forces throughout the world.

Yet there have been UN peace and security efforts during the period. Peacekeeping forces were sent to the Middle East, the Belgian Congo, and Cyprus. The good offices of the Secretary-General and Security Council-appointed commissions have provided third party assistance in several potential or actual conflict situations. The General Assembly's Committee of 33 sought unsuccessfully to achieve agreement on peacekeeping guidelines. The Security Council, made more representative by the seating of mainland China and expansion to 15 members, not only adopted many resolutions pertaining to conflicts, but developed several useful procedures. The General Assembly adopted numerous resolutions concerning conflict situations. Nevertheless, as memories of World War II fade, nations still place primary security dependence on the threat and use of military force.

Anarchy

Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, in his candid report on the Work of the Organization to the 37th UN General Assembly, said, "We are perilously near a new international anarchy." Anarchy is defined as the "complete absence of government and law." We know that the United Nations is not a world government. We know, too, that existing international law does not restrain nations from the threat and use of national military power as a sovereign right.

We view with pride those cases where the United Nations has dealt effectively with actual or impending aggression across national borders. We view with concern, however, the inability of the United Nations to influence members to comply with the resolutions of either the Security Council or the General Assembly and those situations where the United Nations has been completely bypassed as members resort to armed conflict.

War continues. A recent issue of *The Defense Monitor*, published by the Center for Defense Information, lists five wars between nations and thirty-five civil or guerilla wars, many involving external support or intervention. Ruth Sivard in the 1982 edition of *World Military and Social Expenditures* estimates that in the period 1960-1982

more than 10,700,000 people lost their lives as a result of war. Moreover, there are numerous situations—hot spots—where national passions are aroused, rhetoric is inflamed, and hostilities could easily break out.

Yes, there is anarchy and we are fully warranted in seeking to increase the effectiveness of UN peace and security mechanisms and to encourage members to use the United Nations to deal with potential, threatened, or actual aggression and breaches of peace.

Discussion Focus

Responding to the Secretary-General's challenge, we will focus on the peace and security functions of the United Nations under the authorities of the Charter. Time will not permit us to discuss major Charter revisions, although many UN observers believe this is the route to improved UN effectiveness.

Time constraints will allow only peripheral attention to the availability, use, and acceptance of judicial or quasi-judicial mechanisms to resolve controversies between nations and their nationals. Such dispute resolution would reduce the temptation to resort to the threat and use of armed force.

We will have time for only limited attention to halting and reversing the nuclear and conventional arms races. Disarmament progress would reduce tensions and release financial and human resources for important needs.

These three elements are closely related. Fuller utilization of the UN Charter authorities for collective action to cope with threatened or actual aggression and breaches of peace will encourage progress towards greater reliance on the International Court of Justice and nonviolent resolution of controversies and on disarmament.

Pacific Settlement

Those disputes that actually come before the United Nations are but the tip of the iceberg since most controversies among nations do not endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Those that do, however, deserve prompt and effective response. Pacific settlement (Chapter VI) is the Security Council's preferred method of dealing with them. Article 33 commits members to "first of all, seek a solution by...peaceful means

of their own choice." Failing this, Article 37 obligates them to refer the dispute to the Security Council.

The Security Council becomes involved either from its own awareness or because the dispute is brought before it by the disputing members, by another member (Article 35), the Secretary-General (Article 99), or the General Assembly (Article 11). All too frequently, the Security Council is involved only after the use of armed force is at least threatened, if not initiated.

Under Article 33, the Security Council shall "when it deems necessary" call on disputing parties to seek resolution by peaceful means. Under Article 34 it "may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute...." Under Article 36, the Security Council may "recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment...take into consideration that legal disputes should...be referred...to the International Court of Justice." Article 53 permits the Security Council to utilize regional arrangements created under the provisions of Chapter VIII.

The Secretary-General's role beyond bringing threatening situations to the Security Council includes administering functions entrusted by the Security Council (Article 98) and utilizing good offices in the interests of international peace and security.

The General Assembly considers not only general principles related to the maintenance of international peace, security, and disarmament, but also threatening situations brought to it by any member or the Security Council (Article 11). Unless the Security Council is dealing with a particular situation, the General Assembly may make recommendations to the states concerned, to the Security Council, or both.

With all of this in mind, our discussions should focus on how to make prompt, effective, and full use of these authorities and roles.

—How may disputing parties be encouraged to honor their Article 33 and Article 37 commitments?

—What fact finding systems or procedural modifications would contribute to early awareness by the Security Council of situations threatening international peace and security?

—Can the Security Council use more effectively its au-

thority to investigate disputes likely to endanger peace and security?
—Can better use be made of the Secretary-General's good offices and Security Council dispatched missions, mediators, and observers to avoid armed conflict?
—How may the relevant functions of the Security Council, the Secretary-General, and the General Assembly be better harmonized?
—Would greater use of regional organizations facilitate peace efforts?
—What measures would enhance the implementation of Security Council resolutions?
—What modifications of operating modalities would enhance the functioning of the Security Council?
—Would changes in the size and methods of selecting its members enhance Security Council effectiveness?

Halting Armed Conflict

Aware that even diligent pacific settlement efforts may fail, the delegates at San Francisco added Chapter VII: "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression."

The Security Council is charged by the Charter to determine the existence of threats or breaches of peace or acts of aggression (Article 39); to make recommendations or decide on measures to maintain or restore peace and security (Article 39); and to call on the parties concerned to comply (Article 40). The Security Council may decide on measures not involving armed force: interruption of economic relations and communications, or a severance of diplomatic relations (Article 41). If such measures are deemed or proved inadequate, the Security Council may call for military action by members' air, sea, or land forces (Article 42).

Article 49 commits members to provide mutual assistance to carry out Security Council measures and to furnish armed forces, assistance, and facilities (Articles 43, 44, and 45). The Military Staff Committee assists and advises the Security Council (Articles 46 and 47).

Since the massive use of UN armed forces in Korea, UN peacekeeping forces authorized by the Security Council have, on several occasions, maintained ceasefires agreed to by the combatants, the so-called Chapter

VI 1/2 action. Other UN efforts to halt aggression have included General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, dispatch of military observers, and behind-the-scenes work by mediators and missions to encourage ceasefires.

On balance, UN efforts to halt aggression have not been highly successful. The collective security approach of Korea has not been repeated; sanctions have not been used against combatants. UN maintained ceasefires have been tenuous and have seldom been followed by successful peacemaking. Certainly there is a need to strengthen UN capability to halt aggression and to speed the resolution of the disputes that caused the conflicts.

—Are there situations where Security Council sanctions against combatants could be effective?
—Must UN peacekeeping action be entirely dependent on the consent of the combatants, even when conflict endangers international peace and security?
—Should the Security Council encourage and support peacekeeping activities by regional organizations?
—What would strengthen the UN peacekeeping regime? Guidelines? Renewed member commitment? Reactivated military staff? Advance commitments of members' forces and use of bases, facilities, and logistic support? A UN peacekeeping fund?
—When should consideration be given to organizing a UN peacekeeping headquarters, staffed with cadres of specialized units?
—Can more effective use be made of the good offices of the Secretary-General and Security Council commissions to obtain ceasefires?
—What measures would speed resolution of disputes once ceasefires are obtained?

General Assembly

As the organ most concerned with harmonizing the action of nations, the General Assembly can do more to maintain international peace and security than just debate and pass resolutions on specific controversies or conflicts. Promotion of cooperation in the political field and codification of international law (Article 13) would lessen the likelihood of controversies becoming conflicts.

Serious consideration of the general principles of

maintaining international peace and security and disarmament matters (Article 11) would also improve the global climate and enhance Security Council efforts to deal with disputes and conflict. Working through committees, the General Assembly could develop helpful procedures. The Committee of 33, which is endeavoring to develop guidelines for peacekeeping operations, is an example.

Finally, should minor amendments to the Charter such as another increase in the size of the Security Council be found desirable, General Assembly action provides the likely procedure for change (Article 108)

—How may the General Assembly contribute more to the maintenance of international peace and security?

—Are there modifications of attitudes, procedures, and modalities relating to international peace and security which would enhance harmonization of relationships between UN organs and its members?

Member States

We come now to the most important element of our discussions, the members of the United Nations. We all know that members control what does or does not happen at the United Nations. Equally true is the fact that the United Nations does not transcend nations, but rather seeks to harmonize their actions. Why then should members positively respond to the Secretary-General's challenge? The answer: mutual interest, both near term and particularly longer range.

Common Interests

Freedom from the threat and trauma of war is the paramount mutual interest. The destructive power of even conventional weapons is so enormous that the death and destruction resulting from their extensive use are beyond the bounds of reason and decency. Nuclear weapons hold their possessors in a frightening hostage; their use would obliterate cities, regions, countries, and threaten human survival. War is no longer a viable method of resolving disputes between nations. The security of every nation will be enhanced by strengthening and using the United Nations' capability to prevent armed aggression across national boundaries and, should it occur, to bring it to an early halt.

Avoidance of armed conflict through strengthened UN peace and security mechanisms offer nations a

common economic benefit by encouraging disarmament. Military budgets would be reduced; funds would be released for critical civilian needs—global as well as national. While the economic gains would be greatest for the major powers, benefits would also accrue to developing nations to reduce their own military budgets. Trade and economic assistance would be stimulated globally.

Reduced tensions is another common interest. Greater and more effective use of UN peace and security mechanisms, coupled with greater use of legal and quasi-legal resolution of international controversies, would reduce fears, prejudices, and hatred among nations. The General Assembly would find it easier to harmonize the action of members to deal with its long agenda of critical global problems. Solution of these problems would be eased by reorienting technical and managerial resources from military to civilian problems.

The whole world would benefit from the avoidance of confrontation on the part of the major military powers. If potentially dangerous situations are effectively dealt with by the United Nations, there is less likelihood of involvement from parties outside the dispute. Were the United States and the Soviet Union to consistently support the use of UN peace and security mechanisms, the chances of their confrontation would be reduced to the benefit of us all.

National Will

Despite the compelling logic of such common interests, too few members adequately support UN activities to deal with aggression and breaches of peace. Some completely disregard their Charter obligation to pacifically settle disputes and threaten or, if deemed desirable, use armed force to gain perceived national objectives. They disregard the resolutions and efforts of UN organs to achieve pacific settlement or, if conflict has occurred, to obtain ceasefire agreements.

Noncombatant nations, for various and sometimes obscure reasons, often fail to use their influence to obtain compliance with UN ceasefire resolutions or, after a ceasefire, to encourage combatants to resolve the disputes that led to conflict. UN resolutions and actions seldom succeed without strong support of members, certainly including the veto-endowed permanent members of the Security Council.

The United Nations' failure to eliminate the scourge of war results from inadequate will on the part of members. Although this fact is obvious, it deserves restatement and reemphasis. It is the most crucial element of our deliberations. Even if we develop unique recommendations to improve UN capability to deal with disputes endangering international peace and security, our deliberations will be but an academic exercise unless we stimulate greater national will, particularly that of more powerful nations.

I call on you, therefore, to think creatively of ways to elevate the status of the United Nations in the foreign policies of our countries. Explore, with open minds, how to persuade nations to honor their commitments to pacific settlement inherent in UN membership.

How may strong leadership, responsive to the Secretary-General's challenge, be developed both nationally and globally? A meeting of the Security Council at the highest level? A gathering of heads of state on the occasion of the United Nations' 40th anniversary to rededicate their countries to strengthen and use UN peace and security mechanisms?

Conclusion

A prompt return to the basic concept of the UN Charter "...to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" is long overdue. Without it, the world risks continuing economic deterioration, mounting chaos, and perhaps ultimate nuclear catastrophy. Without a return, the United Nations will continue to lose credibility and, with respect to political matters, become but a debating society. The growing trend towards international anarchy must be reversed.

I trust that in our days together in this pleasant surrounding we will develop pertinent and valid recommendations to enhance UN capability in the area of peace and security. More importantly, I hope we will vigorously challenge the members of the United Nations to reaffirm and respect their solemn commitments to the principles of the UN Charter. May we thus contribute to a prompt return to the Charter's basic intent, a lessening of security reliance on the threat and use of armed force and progress toward a world free from the scourge of war. The stakes are high: time is of the essence. Let us respond to the Secretary-General's challenge.

Rapporteur's Report

Alfred Balk
Rapporteur

The rapporteur prepared this report following the conference. Participants neither reviewed nor approved the report, therefore, it should not be assumed that every participant subscribes to all recommendations, observations, and conclusions.

The United Nations: Peace and Security

Enhancing UN effectiveness in maintaining peace and security was the announced theme of the 18th Stanley Foundation Conference on the United Nations of the Next Decade held June 25-30, 1983, at Burgenstock, Switzerland. The discussions broadened as participants explored the larger context of this historical era and their concern that the United Nations is experiencing a crisis of credibility.

A "Future Shock" Era

The first topic was the unprecedented pace of global change in the nearly four decades since the United Nations' birth—perhaps the most pervasive transformation of human society in history. Nuclear weaponry, computerization, telecommunications, supersonic travel, space exploration, "miracle" drugs, exponential population growth, decolonization, and the dichotomy of the North's affluence alongside the South's deprivation—all have become integral in the international landscape since World War II.

The global political map has been largely redrawn. The United Nations at its founding consisted of 50 nations; today its membership is 157, the majority did not exist independently in 1945. Two former World War II allies—the United States and the Soviet Union—are the preeminent political-military rivals. Former colonies as well as ancient protagonists clash—frequently with sophisticated arms.

Commerce, industry, and communications have become internationalized. New regional and economic groups have been born. A world of disparate nations has become a "global village," living under a nuclear cloud with the burden of proliferating, technologically advanced armaments on which humanity now spends an estimated $750 billion a year—double that of less than a decade ago.

The UN "Malaise"

This cataclysmic rate of change, participants agreed, inexorably has influenced the United Nations. No organization could have escaped the general crisis of institutions—governmental, professional, educational—that distinguishes this era; the United Nations has been

especially vulnerable.

It was created by the victorious powers of World War II without representation of the defeated wartime nations or then-subject colonies. The UN Charter was premised on the cooperation of the wartime victors, assuming protection of their conflicting interests through the Security Council veto. For a period, cooperation seemed a reality—or at least rival interests proved manageable—and the United Nations was instrumental in resolving disputes over Korea, the former Palestine territory, and other issues.

Within a few years, however, as the US-Soviet rivalry sharpened and new nations flooded into the United Nations, the organization's profile and agenda changed. The United States and the Soviet Union tended to order their affairs bilaterally. Dozens of former colonies, seeking to establish independent identities and alliances, shattered the image of what many had viewed as "a Western club." Undramatic UN activities in economic and social areas grew, as did major subheadquarters in Geneva, Paris, Rome, and Vienna.

Increasingly the organization seemed to be bypassed in efforts to maintain international peace and security. Resolutions by its swelling General Assembly membership often were ignored, and the issue generally described by conference participants as the most crucial of our time—nuclear arms control—came to rest outside the UN framework. Overall, as one participant put it, the result has been "a massive spectrum of disillusionment."

Public Perceptions

Overoptimism and rising expectations, characterized as a common phenomenon of this era, were mentioned by several participants as part of the United Nations' plight. More serious, it was generally agreed, is a pervasive lack of awareness of the United Nations' work: of peacekeeping achievements in Cyprus, the Middle East, and elsewhere; of helping encourage orderly decolonization; of extensive refugee aid; of field activities in health, population control, education, agriculture, ecology, and other economic and social areas. Indeed, the United Nations' political component, including peacekeeping and security efforts—on which media coverage centered in New York tends to focus—were

estimated to comprise only 10 to 20 percent of its activities.

Part of the problem lies in the press, it was agreed. The traditional definition of news, emphasizing drama and conflict, often has meant an obsession with the periphery—such as, during the pope's visit to the United Nations, extensive security arrangements, or, during a Special Session on Disarmament, huge antinuclear demonstrations outside, rather than the substance and background of proceedings inside. The traditional conception of news also was said to have prompted decreasing attention to the United Nations as a whole.

"The mood of the press galleries at the United Nations these days is troubling," said one participant with personal media experience. "The refrain is 'There's no story here.' Editorial boards say, 'What do you want us to comment on? There's nothing happening.' "

"Even in the General Assembly," another participant observed, "journalists are saying that events are too dull, too repetitive, and there are too many resolutions that simply aren't news." Still another participant reported that media organizations—especially in television—consistently have reduced staffing at the United Nations, a trend that was forecast to continue.

The United Nations' problems, it was agreed, are more than perceptions. Aside from the paralysis and ill will generated by East-West hostility, internal shortcomings have evolved. The Security Council, for example, was said to function along the lines of the General Assembly—55 speakers took the floor during a recent Council debate on Central America. The General Assembly—now triple its original size—is submerged in resolutions, unable to allocate time for matters widely regarded as vital, and is hamstrung by bloc lobbying and voting. "The urge to public debate," one participant said, "too often cuts across the requirements of diplomacy."

The Secretary-General, meanwhile, also is inundated, frequently with "unimportant" activities that he finds impossible to avoid. "His appointment calendar is full from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m.," said one participant, "and two-thirds of the items could be handled by other people. If a Secretary-General refuses to see an insistent chargé d'affaires, he can be in trouble. We need to get him out

28

of his isolation." Closer contact with the Security Council—said now to consist mainly of perfunctory communication—was described as imperative.

The quality and efficiency of UN employees also was of widespread concern. Proliferation of members and activities has been reflected in payrolls and other costs. This, plus inflation, has resulted in exponential budget growth. Simultaneously, recruitment, organization, and supervision have become more complex.

"Great concern has been expressed among many delegations that the United Nations simply has to work better," said one participant. "All nations now are experiencing serious economic problems and imposing austerity at home. They feel entitled to expect the same austerity at the United Nations in trimming deadwood, limiting programs, arriving at realistic appraisals for the future, and incorporating sound management."

"In the United States especially," another participant declared, "this can have a great impact on public opinion. There is a widespread feeling that the United Nations is not an efficient organization and that the specialized agencies, which have been growing, seem to politicize issues instead of leaving political matters to the General Assembly and the Security Council, where they are supposed to go."

Nonetheless, it was widely agreed that the United Nations has broad and deep support. "In the United States," said one participant, "the United Nations has enjoyed greater support and approval among the public than in government. There clearly is a sympathy with the instrument that exists. There must be a perception that the mechanism is adequate."

"In Europe," said one European participant, "the United Nations is regarded as a given. We simply cannot conceive of a world without it."

"The image of the United Nations is extremely favorable in most of the world—especially the Third World," added a third participant. "The general public is not so much hostile as uninformed."

The Peace and Security Record

Preventing war, it could be argued, is the paramount purpose of the United Nations: Its Charter's Preamble

begins with a reference to the framers' determination "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." Chapter I on "Purpose and Principles" states as the first purpose "to maintain international peace and security." The first UN activity to which an entire chapter is devoted is "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" (Chapter VI). Coupled with Chapter VII on "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," the provisions of the two chapters were designed to provide procedures whereby incipient combat, if not outright war, could be forestalled.

In a number of instances, the framers' formula was credited with having succeeded. In an early postwar conflict in the former Palestine territory, UN representatives Folke Bernadotte and Ralph Bunche carried out a historic mediation. Other UN actions have prevented, ameliorated, or halted armed conflicts in, among other places, the Golan Heights, the former Belgian Congo, Rhodesia, and South West Africa. In some cases after fighting has already begun, the United Nations has been able to help end hostilities and has deployed peacekeeping forces to inhibit conflict. In Cyprus, for example, a UN peacekeeping force in a disputed area has helped prevent renewed combat between Greece and Turkey for nearly two decades.

It was recalled, however, that the US Center for Defense Information's *Defense Monitor* recently listed 40 current major and minor armed conflicts involving more than four million people in combat and reported that, in the preceding three years, while two conflicts have ended six have begun. It also was noted that, as stated in the conference chairman's opening remarks, "an increasing tendency...to bypass the United Nations or disregard its efforts" has been demonstrated in Vietnam, Ethiopia-Somalia, Iraq-Iran, the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, and Afghanistan.

Moreover, it was the consensus that the East-West superpower rivalry has turned more menacing, thwarting détente-inspired hopes of a reversal of the nuclear arms spiral, encouraging proliferating arms sales, and limiting defusion of the potential for local conflicts to explode into superpower confrontations. Indeed, a pervasive sentiment throughout the conference was frustration and despair over US-Soviet relations.

"The two nations are on a collision course," declared one European participant, and another added, "There seems little chance of making the United Nations work if the two dominant powers in it remain at odds." Accordingly, only guarded optimism was expressed that any proposals to foster peaceful settlement of disputes could succeed unless the United States and the Soviet Union improve their relationship.

Pacific Settlement of Disputes: The Security Council

The Charter places the first obligation for peaceful settlement of disputes "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security" on member nations. If that fails, it grants the Security Council the authority to become involved (Article 33). Participants lamented, however, that the UN Charter's chapter on pacific settlement has become largely "dormant," and they assigned much of the responsibility to the Security Council. The East-West conflict and permanent members' frequent resort to the veto were recognized as part of the problem, yet many areas of improvement were said to remain.

Much emphasis was placed on "preemptive diplomacy"—achieving Security Council involvement early enough in disputes to prevent their escalation. This could encompass appointment of *ad hoc* committees of its own members—perhaps three to four per committee—to monitor given sensitive situations. Permanent Council members, inasmuch as they retain a vote in and a veto on any full Security Council action, might voluntarily disqualify themselves from committee membership. Members of some committees might be officials of higher rank than UN permanent representatives.

Emphasis was also placed on more effective use of the Security Council's authority and responsibility regarding pacific settlement of disputes. Suggestions included adequate investigation of disputes, innovative consideration of settlement procedures, stronger pressure on disputing parties, and continued monitoring of the implementation of Council resolutions. Another innovation might be a counterpart of the Organization of African Unity's Commission on Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration. Such a group could investigate a problem and make a report without the threat of an activity-blocking veto.

Assistance to regional organizations was regarded as extremely important—"the one area," according to one participant from a developing country, "in which we ought to be able to make an immediate advance." Members of the nonaligned nations movement, it was emphasized, offer a rich potential for new initiatives. New leadership, rotating representation on the Security Council, and an announced orientation away from confrontation and toward problem-solving portend to a number of participants positive new resources in this field.

In short, said one, "Even if one is not optimistic that the working relationships between the United States and Soviet Union will improve enough to allow the enforcement provisions to be used, they can become instruments of persuasion. It is more difficult for one country to fight another if its dispute is under public consideration in the Council."

Pacific Settlement: The Secretary-General

The office of the Secretary-General, participants almost unanimously agreed, embodies the greatest hope to overcome inertia. He was described as "the one UN official who belongs to everyone" and "the one UN representative who can speak with authority." In the words of one European participant, "The more divided the world, the more responsibility there is on him." As the United Nations has evolved, the Secretary-General's role has grown—"the one position that has," according to one participant.

Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar has announced plans for a more forthright role in bringing disputes endangering peace and security to the Security Council's attention, developing a stronger capacity for fact finding, and coordinating these and other efforts closely with the Council. Most participants seemed to support his plans and expressed the belief that the major powers would countenance them. All, it was said, would be reluctant to risk the stigma of trying to block him.

To realize new hopes for the Secretary-General, however, it was generally agreed that several innovations are necessary. One is to reverse the trend toward concentrating Secretariat activity in his office. One solution urged was to constitute his under-secretaries as a diplomatic cabinet through which designated functions

would be channeled.

Liaison between the Security Council and Secretary-General was said to be casual, confined principally to protocol luncheons not necessarily attended by a number of permanent members. These occasions, it was proposed, should be changed to working luncheons, monthly, with timely agendas and candid exchanges of information and ideas.

Independent committees of economists, lawyers, and other specialists, it was suggested, could be commissioned to keep critical areas and situations under review. At minimum, the group was told, in some cases authoritative reports could have an impact comparable to those of Amnesty International on human rights. Improved liaison with regional organizations also was described as essential.

Better information resources were given high priority. "When trouble is starting," said one participant, "the Secretary-General is often the last to know." The Secretary-General was said to now be heavily dependent on inexperienced people, and, like the Security Council, frequently to have difficulty obtaining authoritative information on which to act. The solution, it was generally felt, lies not in a network of foreign information ministries—which would be impractical and unaffordable—but rather resources such as the *ad hoc* committees proposed for the Security Council. There would be several advantages, it was suggested, in having the committees report informally to the Secretary-General and formally, on paper, to the Council. The Secretary-General also could appoint private groups to advise him, their members to be approved by the Security Council as he or it deemed appropriate.

Better advantage could be made of the good offices of the Secretary-General to achieve pacific settlements by greater use of mediators, dispatch of observers, and coordination with Security Council authorized commissions. "The influence of an innovative Secretary-General cannot be overestimated," it was said. "If he makes a public statement it can have enough impact on the parties to a dispute to prevent a war. No government likes to be criticized by the Secretary-General."

Pelletier Malone

Jaipal Kittani



Halting Armed Conflicts

Should a dispute flare into armed conflict, Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides for various activities by the Security Council to end the fighting. They begin with recommendations to the parties (Article 39), then proceed to a call for compliance with provisional measures (Article 40); economic and diplomatic sanctions (Article 41); and blockades or other military options (Article 42). All UN members are to make available to the Security Council, on call and "in accordance with a special agreement," armed forces, assistance, and facilities "necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security"—the agreement to be negotiated by the Security Council and member states or groups of states (Article 43).

Members not represented on the Security Council, if asked to provide forces, are to be invited to participate in Security Council decisions concerning their forces (Article 44). All members are to have available air force contingents "for combined international enforcement action" (Article 45). Plans are to be made by the Security Council with a military staff committee (Article 46); the chiefs of staff, or their representatives, of permanent members of the Security Council are, as a military staff committee, to advise the Council on ongoing force needs (Article 47). Action may be taken by only some or all UN members as the Council directs (Article 48); mutual assistance (Article 49), appeals against hardships (Article 50), and the right of self-defense (Article 51) are assured.

These provisions for halting armed conflicts obviously reflect the original signatories' vision of the world as it existed after World War II, yet participants' consensus seemed to be that—assuming members' will to act—they provide sufficient scope for action today. The challenge is to marshal a political consensus and to interpret and apply the provisions to new situations. Here again an overwhelming concern was with the superpowers' perceived determination to pursue their own interests at the expense of multilateral cooperation in conflict resolution. Still, it was emphasized, much can be done to clarify procedures and design mechanisms that would make the use of the Charter's Chapter VII more feasible and appealing.

One suggestion was greater use of advisory opinions

concerning situations which seem to call for sanctions. Such an opinion could be requested from the International Court of Justice—as was helpful in the case of Namibia—before action by either the Secretary-General or the Security Council.

The notion of "automatic sanctions," while appealing, was portrayed as controversial. If the Security Council calls for a ceasefire when one side has lost territory, for instance, one participant questioned whether the one whose territory is occupied should be branded an aggressor for disobeying the order. On the other hand, it was pointed out, the premise of a ceasefire is to permit a dispute to be solved by peaceful means.

Attention also was called to the growing phenomenon of conflicts within individual countries. Consideration might be given, it was suggested, to Security Council efforts to discourage foreign assistance to any of the combatants.

Former Secretary-General Trygve Lie, it was recalled, envisioned a small UN guard which could be used for immediate intervention in breaches of the peace. While the advantages of such a standby force were said to be apparent, the disadvantages were deemed to outweigh them: problems of recruitment, cost, discipline, and combat readiness. The United Nations already faces resistance to assessments for regular activities, it was pointed out. The alternative of standby forces on call from member countries, rather than a standing force, was adjudged as the most that could be achieved at this time.

Use of UN Peacekeeping Forces

Although the Charter does not provide for the creation of peacekeeping forces, UN members have employed "implied prerogatives" of Chapter VII to place military units between previously warring parties. This technique has had mixed success, but participants generally felt that enough lessons were available that they should be better applied.

One lesson is that peacekeeping forces can be utilized more prudently if the Security Council is advised of and involved in disputes earlier. Another lesson was said to be the necessity of a specific mandate for peacekeeping missions—which was cited as having been the case

at the Golan Heights but not for the more recent UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) mission. Close supervision by the Secretary-General and follow-up monitoring by the Security Council and the governments providing the forces also were urged.

The Nordic countries, Canada, and the Netherlands were mentioned as having standby forces earmarked for possible peacekeeping duty. At the same time, an increasing reluctance of nations to provide peacekeeping personnel was noted—and decried—along with apparent growing difficulty in financing them. Because the impact of nationalistic and ethnic movements, border disputes, and population pressures and poverty was seen as likely to increase the demand for peacekeeping assistance, the General Assembly's Committee of 33 was urged to expedite its protracted deliberations on guidelines for peacekeeping operations.

Some participants suggested that a small standing or standby UN force might be created. Such a force could be put in place quickly and might help deter conflict, it was argued. The idea was criticized by others, however, as being impractical and too costly. Advance creation of a special fund to finance UN peacekeeping units was suggested as a means of facilitating such operations.

A propensity for resorting to multinational forces outside the United Nations, in some instances, also was noted. When Egypt's request for UN forces in the Sinai was denied as a result of intrabloc politics in the United Nations, for instance, a non-UN multinational force was substituted by mutual Egyptian-Israeli consent. Similarly, in 1982 in Lebanon a multinational force was provided in Beirut. While some participants decried any movement away from using UN forces, Lebanon was cited as an example in which multinational and UN forces (stationed previously in southern Lebanon) could coexist. There also remains the possibility that UN units might succeed multinationals. In any event, a participant from a large developing country pointed out, the use of *ad hoc* multinational forces—for all its ambiguities and pitfalls—sometimes may be the most that can be achieved.

The significance of the rise of regional organizations also was emphasized. Such groups as the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of American States,

and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations were portrayed as having not only the potential for, but in some cases the desire to participate in, peacekeeping, possibly in cooperation with the United Nations. The OAU, for example, was interested in a peacekeeping role in Chad but lacked finance for the operation. Where regional organizations could fulfill such a role, it was urged that the United Nations be ready to cooperate with funding help and coordinating expertise. Here, participants from developing countries agreed, there seems to be a wide scope for innovation.

The nonaligned nations movement also was described as offering new potential. The movement—said to be rapidly maturing and becoming increasingly conscious of constructive opportunities—was urged to consider establishing a peacekeeping committee to at least consider cases in which it might help.

A number of participants expressed the conviction that the UN Charter is no barrier to action in any of these areas. As one pointed out, even though it probably could not be amended in the foreseeable future, its authority could be extended by supplementary agreements to which only the signatories would subscribe. Improvision to date was cited as a good omen. While the consensus remained that Charter revision is impractical at this time, some participants held that ultimately changes will be required.

The General Assembly

The UN Charter provides that the General Assembly shall consist of all the members of the United Nations, and that it "may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter." Included within that broad mandate is a Charter provision that the General Assembly may call upon the Security Council to act on matters threatening international peace and security—a practice which has sometimes proved to be contentious. The framers of these provisions scarcely could have envisioned their implications for a General Assembly that quickly tripled in size, with an attendant expansion of both the Assembly's agenda and the number of speakers and resolutions involved in debates. According to one participant, "It has now become almost impossible to deal with all the items before the Assembly."

Urquhart

Hessel

Thunborg

van Well

Ortiz de Rozas

He reported, for example, that a recent General Assembly session had 142 items on its agenda, although a maximum of 60 items would be preferable. This reduction could be achieved were schedules staggered so that certain items came up less often. This would enable greater attention to—and perhaps progress on—three subjects adjudged to be of principal interest: arms control, development, and conflict resolution.

It also was suggested that each session feature two or three important subjects, with which it then would be identified. If the themes were chosen carefully, it was felt, both member satisfaction and public respect for the United Nations would rise.

It also was proposed that, without defeating the General Assembly's purpose of being a forum where all can be heard, some way be found to manage the number and quality of speeches and resolutions which, in the words of one participant, have "become longer and more incomprehensible." Participants recommended consideration of several proposals made at the Stanley Foundation's 9th Conference on the United Nations of the Next Decade. One was better preparation for General Assembly sessions. To facilitate this, it was noted, the General Assembly might elect its officers and constitute the General Committee for each session before the preceding one adjourns or at a brief special session earlier in the calendar year. The General Committee then could be convened early enough to serve as a planning and steering committee. In addition, it was suggested that working committees or groups within main committees be encouraged to function the year around.

Rules were also proposed to provide a reasonable minimum waiting period between reporting a resolution and a vote on it in the Assembly, and to limit general debate in committees. Where appropriate, position papers for the record could be circulated in advance.

Representatives of nations less accustomed than others to parliamentary imperatives were reported to be "making an effort at discipline" concerning General Assembly rhetoric, and the OAU was commended for a useful example on the handling of resolutions: at a recent meeting a proposed major resolution was one page in length, and, as finally adopted, only one and one-fourth pages.

Member Responsibility

Upon joining the United Nations each member subscribes to the UN Charter, which states in part, "All members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter."

The importance of this pledge, it was agreed, has become increasingly apparent, for no organization can function any better than its members allow. To the extent that they seek to exploit or undermine the organization for their own ends, its ability to act may be so weakened that neither they nor others may benefit from the organization. The United Nations was seen as particularly fragile because of its youth, its uniqueness, the enormous global changes to which it has had to adapt, and the fact that to fulfill its purpose it must be truly international, open to all nations regardless of political, cultural, and economic differences.

Some nations, however, are "more equal" than others, as one participant stated, "on a scale of power, the greater the power the greater the responsibility." By that measure the great powers were said to bear the greatest responsibility for making the United Nations work; no organization, it was stressed, can succeed without the cooperation of its two most powerful members. Indeed, it can be regarded as a tribute to the United Nation's durability as well as to the determination of the majority of its members that it has survived the Cold War, membership expansion, decolonization and the resultant change in voting patterns, and the latest phase of US-Soviet conflict.

"A plague on both your houses" was said to have become an increasingly prevalent attitude toward the superpowers by members who both resent and fear the implications of current superpower policies. For while the United States and Soviet Union remain preoccupied with adding to arms overkill directed at each other, it was pointed out, progress is delayed in evolving a security system that requires fewer arms, stimulates peaceful settlement, and enables attention to world needs in health, education, population control, economic development, ecology, protection and development of space and ocean resources, and a peace-enhancing political structure.

Hope was expressed that economics and domestic political pressures might finally be forcing the superpowers toward an arms control agreement which could lead to a relaxation of tensions and a more defensible example of superpower responsibility in the United Nations. "The superpowers," one participant pointed out, "are not immune to outside influence."

Meanwhile, there was some optimism that regional organizations and the nonaligned nations movement might help foster greater membership responsibility. To the extent that they can impose discipline and manage their affairs without the paralysis inflicted by the superpowers on the United Nations, it was said, they can build responsibility, inhibit conflicts that could involve the great powers, and help limit outside intrusions in regional affairs. Moreover, by giving weight in the United Nations to bloc interests based on broad rather than narrow ideological or ethnic concerns these groups can help raise the level of dialogue and the productivity of negotiations. They thus can help improve the UN climate for all.

Except in the Middle East situation—which was viewed as apparently intractable at this stage—the outlines of this multipolar improvement were thought to be in evidence, with both the nonaligned nations' and the Organization of African Unity's leadership exerting pressure on their members and others who seek their cooperation to turn from rhetoric to diplomacy and from small-bloc to larger-bloc politics.

"The rule of law is extremely important," said one Third World participant. "All our countries are guilty of having undermined it."

The Future

Skeptical as some participants were about the prospects for imminent change in the international climate, all appeared to concur that even the present adversity contains opportunities to strengthen UN peace and security capability. The consensus was that one such opportunity will be in connection with the organization's 40th anniversary in 1985. The nonaligned nations movement has proposed a gathering of the heads of state to consider world problems. Conference participants were enthusiastic about scheduling that gathering to coincide with the anniversary observance.

If carefully planned, it was suggested, the occasion

could serve as a time of member nations' recommitment to the UN Charter. Special regional events also could support that purpose. Because maximizing the impact of the occasion will require planning, it was urged that a preparatory committee be formed in the United Nations and possibly even a special session be scheduled to prepare.

Several long-term public information proposals were offered. One was to explore the use of a satellite or cable TV channel for a brief, regular UN program, perhaps a half hour in length. Another was to consider a regular media-oriented official summary of UN activities, possibly weekly. It also was suggested that the Secretary-General, among other officials, make himself available to TV interviewers more often. In addition, the group was reminded of the importance of getting materials directly to the public—especially college-age students and younger, who might be regarded as more interested and receptive than older generations. The importance of professionalism was stressed, including starting any reappraisal of UN information programs with expert professional counsel.

Participants emphasized that, deep as the United Nations' and world problems may seem, a sense of perspective is imperative. "During the détente and economic growth of the 1970s," said one, "perhaps we became too optimistic about what could be achieved." In historical perspective, it was noted, 38 years can be considered a short period, especially in the life of a global institution. For all its weaknesses and frustrations, the United Nations has proved resilient, and though much remains to be done, an honest appraisal reveals many achievements.

Moreover, it was said, to the nonaligned nations—the majority in the world—there is no other global organization to which to turn for help in creating the climate essential for development; and even for the superpowers, the age of interdependence means that the United Nations—"the house of interdependence," in the words of one participant—has become indispensable in helping order global activities and arrangements. "At least," said one participant, "we can hope to get an incremental value from the United Nations." Summing up, a colleague added, "There is so much work to do that the United Nations must go on. It can't be stopped."

Waldheim

Hollai

van der Klaauw

Suy

Liang

Eddy Maynard

Chairman's Observations

These observations were prepared by the chairman, C. Maxwell Stanley, following the conference. They reflect discussion, not only at this conference, but also at prior Stanley Foundation conferences.

Chairing the 18th Conference on the United Nations of the Next Decade was a challenging experience. Seldom has a group so talented, so experienced, and so concerned gathered to examine so important a topic—the maintenance of international peace and security. What did we accomplish?

Appraisal

Participants strongly reemphasized the urgency of making greater use of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security and the importance of strengthening and improving UN procedures. Economic and political as well as security benefits to nations and to the world community fully justify such efforts. War has become too destructive and too costly to remain an acceptable method of resolving disputes between nations.

Participants agreed that Chapters VI and VII of the Charter plus the authorities granted to the Secretary-General and the General Assembly provide workable, albeit slow and awkward, mechanisms for pacific settlement and for dealing with threats to peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression. No dramatic alternatives were proposed, but a number of modified procedures, modalities, and relationships were suggested.

Finally, participants strongly emphasized that the effectiveness of the United Nations and the maintenance of international peace and security depend upon the member states. The negative impacts of the US-USSR confrontation and the tendency of these nations to deal with peace and security issues outside of the United Nations were repeatedly stated. Also mentioned was the failure of less powerful nations to peacefully settle their disputes and to strongly support UN peace and security efforts. The conclusion: without a strong resurgence of national determination to use the United Nations, its efforts to maintain international peace and

security will remain haphazard and will fall far short of its potential.

Challenge

What is required to awaken national leaders, particularly major military powers, to the insanity and hazards of today's conventional and nuclear arms races? Have they entirely forgotten the lessons of World War II? Have they no regard for the wisdom of national leaders in 1945 who recognized the utter necessity of not only creating but using an international organization to "save future generations from the scourge of war"? Must there be another major war to convince its survivors, if there would be any, that the world must use global institutions to maintain international peace, that the threat and use of national armed might is no longer valid?

Only mounting public demand encouraged by opinion shapers within and without governments is likely to stimulate the awakening of national leaders. Now is the time to convince them of the benefits—security, economic, and political—of recommitment to the basics of the United Nations. The UN Charter, despite its weaknesses, does provide ways to deal with international disputes provided that member states are willing to use them.

Recommitment

The 40th anniversary of the signing of the UN Charter will occur in 1985. This occasion provides a unique opportunity for member states to reexamine the United Nations and recommit themselves to use and strengthen its capabilities to maintain international peace and security. Jonathan Schell, in his dynamic and powerful book *The Fate of the Earth*, said, and I agree with him, "We must lay down our arms, relinquish sovereignty, and found a political system for the peaceful settlement of international disputes." This is the urgent dictate of the nuclear age; nothing less guarantees human survival.

Special Message

From UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar

The Stanley Foundation Conferences on the United Nations of the Next Decade have consistently proved a valuable tool in advancing the work of the United Nations. This conference comes at a particularly appropriate time in the history of international affairs—a time marked by general international divisions and disorder, a succession of international crises as well as stalemates on a number of fundamental international issues.

As I indicated in my report to the last General Assembly, I am deeply concerned over this state of affairs and particularly the inability of the United Nations itself to play as effective and decisive a role as the Charter envisaged in the maintenance of international security. In my report I also advanced a number of suggestions as to how the situation could be improved.

It was gratifying that the General Assembly unanimously expressed its appreciation for this report and emphasized the imperative need to strengthen the role and effectiveness of the United Nations. That same resolution invited "the Secretary-General in discharging his responsibilities under the Charter to continue his efforts towards strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to fulfil the effective and decisive role as envisaged for it in the Charter," and urged "that efforts to this end continue, taking into account the views expressed by Member States...while views of institutions and eminent persons may also be taken into consideration as appropriate."

Accordingly, your meeting this year has a special dimension. You are responding directly to a recommendation of the General Assembly, and I am most pleased that the Stanley Foundation should have taken up this challenge by gathering a group of such distinguished participants, to lend counsel and advice on how we can move towards a more peaceful world.

I regret I cannot be with you in person as I had hoped. However, I wish you every success in your deliberations and look forward with great interest to reading the report of your proceedings.

Leprette

Adeniji

R. Stanley

Salim

Parsons

Publications

Publications available free of charge include:

The United Nations: 1. Conflict Management, 2. Effective Administration, Fourteenth United Nations Procedures Conference Report. May 1983, 40 pp.

Global Citizenship, An Address by C. Maxwell Stanley. April 1983, 16 pp.

Soviet Security in Flux, Occasional Paper 33. Nish Jamgotch, Jr. May 1983, 32 pp.

Myths and Realities: American Nuclear Strategy, Occasional Paper 32. Louis René Beres. December 1982, 28 pp.

US Policy and North-South Relations, US-China Relations in the 1980s, US Security and Arms Control in Europe, US-Soviet Strategic Nuclear Negotiations, Twenty-Third Strategy for Peace Conference Report. October 1982, 64 pp.

Maintaining Peace in Outer Space, Seventeenth United Nations of the Next Decade Conference Report. June 1982, 48 pp.

Resource Optimization and World Peace, Occasional Paper 30. Arthur H. Purcell. March 1982, 24 pp.

Radiological Weapons Control: A Soviet and US Perspective, Occasional Paper 29. Victor L. Issraelyan and Charles C. Flowerree. February 1982, 32 pp.

North-South Relations and International Security, Energy and US Security, US Nonproliferation Strategy, Military Competition in Space, Future US/Soviet Relations, Twenty-Second Strategy for Peace Conference Report. October 1981, 72 pp.

A New International Diplomatic Order, Occasional Paper 24. Tom Boudreau. December 1980, 24 pp.

Also available:

Managing Global Problems. C. Maxwell Stanley. 1979, 286 pp. Management concepts applied to major global problems. Hardcover $12.50, softcover $7.95, postpaid from the Foundation. Now at special rates of $7.50 and $5.50.

The Stanley Foundation
420 East Third Street
Muscatine, Iowa 52761
Telephone 319-264-1500

Activities

The Stanley Foundation encourages study, research, and education in the field of international policy contributing to a secure peace with freedom and justice. Programming reflects founder and President C. M. Stanley's long-time concern for global security. Stanley Foundation activities include the following conferences and publications.

Strategy for Peace Conference. Meeting in small discussion groups, some 80 opinion shapers and decision makers explore US foreign policy concerns and recommend actions and policies.

United Nations of the Next Decade Conference. Convened alternately in the United States and abroad, this annual conference brings together 25 ambassadors, Secretariat officials, foreign ministry officials, and international experts from the private sector to consider UN problems and prospects.

United Nations Procedures Conference. Current UN concerns and organizational procedures are examined by 25 diplomats, Secretariat officials, and academic specialists at informal discussion sessions.

Vantage Conferences. A wide variety of multilateral and bilateral policy matters are frankly discussed by closely involved experts on an intermittent basis.

Occasional Papers. Policy-oriented essays by diverse authors are published periodically as Occasional Papers. These papers concern improvement of international organization or specific US foreign policy issues. Manuscript submissions are invited.

Common Ground. Radio Series on World Affairs. This uncommon program on world issues features discussion by US and foreign experts on political, economic, military, and social issues in international relations. A cassette listing is available.

World Press Review. This monthly magazine excerpts and reprints material from the press outside the United States. Sold by subscription from World Press Review, 230 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10169.

The Stanley Foundation, a private operating foundation, does not provide grants. Conference reports and Occasional Papers are distributed free. A publications list is available.

United Nations of the Next Decade

In 1945, representatives of 50 nations signed the United Nations Charter in San Francisco "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights...to promote social progress...to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security."

Twenty years later delegates from 114 nations convened in San Francisco to commemorate that event. Upon the eve of that symbolic session, C. Maxwell Stanley gathered respected individuals from 13 nations to discuss the role of the United Nations in the next decade.

Since 1967, similar United Nations of the Next Decade conferences have assembled annually under Stanley Foundation sponsorship. Conference conclusions and recommendations are presented in a conference report which is distributed worldwide.

The selection of conference topics and the high quality of participants have produced recommendations which have been of value to governments and to the United Nations.

Conference sites have been selected to reflect the international dimension of this conference series and to promote personal relationships so important to mutual understanding.

1965 San Francisco, California, USA
1967 Burgenstock, Switzerland
1968 Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia
1969 Quebec, Canada
1970 Fredensborg, Denmark
1971 Sinaia, Romania
1972 South Egremont, Massachusetts, USA
1973 Amalfi, Italy
1974 Vail, Colorado, USA
1975 Baden bei Wien, Austria
1976 Charlottesville, Virginia, USA
1977 San Juan del Rio, Mexico
1978 Iowa City, Iowa, USA
1979 Porvoo, Finland
1980 Woodstock, Vermont, USA
1981 Warwick, Bermuda
1982 Cooperstown, New York, USA
1983 Burgenstock, Switzerland